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Endogenous Information Flows and the Clustering of 
Announcements 
 
 
Abstract 
We consider the release of information by a firm when the manager has discretion 
regarding the timing of its release.  While it is well known that firms appear to delay the 
release of bad news, we examine how external information about the state of the 
economy (or the industry) affects this decision. We develop a dynamic model of strategic 
disclosure in which a firm may privately receive information at a time that is random 
(and independent of the state of the economy). Because investors are uncertain regarding 
whether and when the firm has received information, the firm will not necessarily 
disclose the information immediately.  We show that bad news about the economy can 
trigger the immediate release of information by firms.  Conversely, good news about the 
economy can slow the release of information by firms.  As a result, the release of 
negative information tends to be clustered. Surprisingly, this result holds only when firms 
can preempt the arrival of external information by disclosing their own information first. 
These results have implications for conditional variance and skewness of stock and 
market returns.  
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 1. Introduction 
One of the most important ingredients to the process of price discovery in financial 
markets is the flow of new information.  The importance of information flow is perhaps 
most apparent during times of market “crisis,” when it often seems that bad news is being 
reported simultaneously from multiple sources.  This clustering of news could occur 
because firms learn more during bad times, or because firms strategically time the release 
of information.  Indeed, it has long been recognized in the literature that corporate news 
disclosures are controlled by self-interested agents, and a number of theoretical and 
empirical analyses have found support for the idea that given this discretion, managers 
may choose to delay the release of bad news.2  
As hinted above, in addition to delays in the release of information, casual observation 
suggests that disclosures of bad news are often clustered in bad times.  While it is not 
surprising that firms’ news are affected by market and sector conditions (given the 
correlation of their cash flows), the timing of the announcements is suggestive that these 
disclosure decisions are not made independently.  Indeed, recent empirical work by Tse 
and Tucker (2007), who employ a duration model to study whether managers “herd” in 
announcing earnings warnings, finds that earnings warnings within an industry are 
clustered and that firms speed up their warnings in response to poor market conditions.  
In contrast, they show that such clustering is asymmetric in that good news does not 
generate such clustering.  
In this paper, we seek an endogenous explanation for this asymmetry in the clustering of 
disclosure of good and bad news.   We study disclosure dynamics when a firm possesses 
information that is correlated with market conditions, and explore managers’ incentives 
to delay the disclosure of bad news, as opposed to good news, until market conditions 
worsen and become public knowledge.   To the extent that such incentives exist, it can 
                                                 
2 See for example Dye (1990), Rajan (1994), Dye and Sridhar (1995), Genotte and Trueman (1996), Shin 
(2003), Burgstahler and Dichev (1997),. Empirical support can be found in Miller (2002) who compares 
voluntary disclosures by firms that enjoy strong earnings performance to firms that experience earnings 
declines. He finds an increase in voluntary disclosures during periods of increased earnings. 
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have important consequences for the aggregate information flow to the market and as a 
result for the conditional volatility and skewness of market and stock returns.  In addition 
to their potential implications regarding market information flows and volatility, these 
results also suggest new empirical tests of whether managers do indeed time their 
information release. 
We examine a dynamic game in which a manager of a firm decides when to report 
information regarding the value of the firm he manages. The manager maximizes the 
present value of her expected compensation, where the rate of compensation at each point 
in time is proportional to the market value of the firm conditional on public information. 
The firm learns its information at a random time.  Because investors are uncertain 
whether a manager has learned the information, in equilibrium only those firms that have 
sufficiently positive news will release their information.  Firms with more negative 
information will prefer to keep their market value higher – at least temporarily – by 
claiming that they do not yet have any information to report.    
We then extend the model by supposing that in addition to the disclosure by the manager 
there is an external public signal about market conditions that will arrive at a future date. 
As alluded to earlier, while the timing of firm’s information is uncorrelated with market 
conditions, we assume the value of the firm is correlated with this market news.  
Therefore, the public news announcement will affect the market value of the firm.   
Our goal is to understand whether these interactions can lead to clustering in the release 
of information by firms even when the arrival of the underlying information is not 
clustered.  To this end, we characterize the equilibrium conditions of this dynamic 
disclosure game and consider the resulting information release patterns. We begin in 
Section 3 with a negative, benchmark result.  There we show that if the firm is unable to 
preempt the external news by releasing its own information ex-ante, then the external 
news has no effect on the firm’s ex-post rate of disclosure.  Thus, absent preemption 
there is no relation between the news announcement and the timing of disclosures.  
Section 4 then establishes the main result of the paper.  In contrast to the prior setting, we 
now allow the firm to release its information before the external news is announced.  In 
the resulting dynamic disclosure game, because disclosure is irreversible, the firm faces a 
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real options problem with regard to its disclosure decision: disclosing positive 
information may raise the stock price immediately, but gives up the option that the 
external public news would have had an even more positive impact on the stock price if 
the firm had not yet disclosed.  In this case, we find that external market news can lead to 
an endogenous acceleration or deceleration in the rate of disclosure.   In particular, in 
PROPOSITION 5 -- the main result of the paper -- we show that the release of negative 
information about the market accelerates the release of information by the firm.  
Moreover, the particular pattern of acceleration depends on the level of the public news.  
We show that there are two regimes: 
• If the information about market conditions is below a certain threshold then it 
may induce the firm to immediately release its information. The probability of 
immediate release is higher when the report on market conditions is lower.  
• If the information about market conditions is above the threshold, then there is no 
immediate release of information by the firm. Still when we look at the delay 
until the report occurs, this delay is shorter when the level of the public news is 
lower. 
One simple intuition for information clustering is the following:  if the news about market 
conditions is bad, this will cause the market value of the firm to fall.  This drop in value 
provides an incentive to release information if it is not as bad as the market now expects.  
That is, the release of negative external information lowers the threshold for disclosure, 
as the relative interpretation of the firm’s news will become more favorable.  However, 
the irrelevance results of Section 3 demonstrate that this simple intuition is not sufficient 
for the clustering of disclosures.  For while negative news about market conditions does 
indeed lower the threshold for which the firm will disclose, it also lowers the posterior 
distribution of the firm’s type.  We show that generally, and somewhat remarkably, these 
effects perfectly cancel out and there is no clustering; that is, the probability that the firm 
will disclose is independent of the level of the public news about the economy.3
                                                 
3 Intuitively, the firm will only disclose its information if it is sufficiently good relative to the current 
expectations of investors.  When there is good (bad) news, this news shifts upwards (downwards) both the 
distribution of the firm’s signal and the expectations of investors.  We show that these two effects offset 
each other, and thus there is no net increase in the probability of disclosure. 
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Thus, the possibility of clustering emerges in our setting only if the firm has at least some 
likelihood of receiving its information prior to the arrival of external information and the 
opportunity to preempt the release of external information by disclosing its own signal 
first.  The results of Section 4 show that clustering arises in a dynamic setting due to the 
endogeneity of the ordering of the disclosure decision. The key is that in such a setting, 
the distribution of types who have not yet disclosed when the public news about the state 
of the economy comes out is an endogenous subset of the original support.  We show that 
in this case the threshold effects outweigh the distributional effects of the public news, 
and clustering emerges.   
To summarize, our model illustrates that the timing option conferred upon firms in the 
dynamic disclosure game is critical to speeding up of disclosures when adverse news hits 
the market. Since positive correlation of types is required for these results, we conclude 
that bunching of disclosures is more likely within an industry, or more generally, within 
similar groups of firms.   
In Section 5, we consider a number of extensions and further implications of our basic 
model.  For example, we demonstrate that voluntary disclosures should cease in the 
period just prior to an anticipated public news announcement.  We also discuss the case 
in which the “public news” the firm reacts to corresponds to voluntary disclosures by 
other firms in the industry.  Finally, we show that our conclusions are robust to 
alternative specifications of the manager’s payoff. 
Section 6 of the paper discusses the implications of our results for stock returns.  There 
we argue that while strategic disclosure leads to positive skewness of individual stock 
returns, the clustering effect leads to a higher correlation of returns in downturns.  As a 
result, we can have negative skewness associated with the market index.  Finally, the 
acceleration of disclosures after bad news implies that market volatility will increase after 
downturns.  These implications find support in the existing evidence on the statistical 
properties of firm and market stock returns (see Black, 1976, Schwert, 1989, 1990, and 
Heston, 1993, among others).  In contrast to the existing literature, our model provides an 
information-theoretic foundation for these stock return properties based on dynamic 
disclosure decisions of firms and managers.  Finally, Section 7 concludes the paper. 
6 
Related Literature 
Our paper is related to a number of theoretical contributions concerning disclosure by 
firms. We explain below how our model differs from these models. In some cases, it is 
the fact that we examine multiple, correlated firms; in some others, it is our focus on a 
dynamic game; and, finally, in a few cases, the differentiating factor is the specific 
channel that drives our dynamic game with multiple firms. 
Single-firm one-time disclosure models are considered in Shin (2003) and Shin (2006). 
Both papers consider disclosure by the manager of a firm with several independent 
projects. The information private to the manager is the number of projects whose 
uncertainty is resolved and whether the outcome was success or failure. The one-time 
disclosure consists of verifiable reports of some or all of these projects. The manager 
attempts to maximize the current share price and the markets rationally anticipate 
manager’s disclosure policy. While this latter aspect of Shin’s papers is similar to our 
setting, the disclosure in our model simply consists of revealing information at a given 
point of time or delaying its release; there is no possibility of any individual firm 
engaging in a partial disclosure at a given point of time as in Shin’s papers. An equally 
important difference is that we examine the effect of external news on the firm’s 
disclosure policy. 
Static disclosure models with multiple firms that relate well to our model are found in 
Dye (1990) and Admati and Pfleiderer (2000). Both these papers consider firms with 
correlated information and model quality of disclosure as a (costly) choice of firms that 
affects the precision of disclosure. Dye considers risk-averse firm-owner and investor, 
and the relevant consideration is one of optimal risk-sharing between these agents at the 
point of firm’s sale. Admati and Pfleiderer, in contrast, have risk-neutral firm-owners and 
disclosures made by one firm are useful for investors in evaluating other firms (as in our 
model).  They also assume that information asymmetry between firm-owners and 
investors reduces firm value. In both papers, the focus is on whether the voluntary 
disclosures by firms are at socially efficient levels of precision or not, and the primary 
result is that in equilibrium, firms may not internalize fully the externality (in risk-sharing 
or firm valuations) from their disclosure on other firms. Though the correlation structure 
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of firm values is identical to our setup, the issue of delay in disclosure does not arise in 
these papers as there is only a one-time disclosure.4
Dynamic or sequential disclosure models are examined in Dye and Sridhar (1995), 
Gennotte and Trueman (1996), and Dierker (2002).  Dye and Sridhar (1995), the most 
closely related paper out of these, considers a model with n firms, each of which may or 
may not have privately observed a signal. If a firm gets a signal it can disclose it in period 
1 or 2. These features of their model are similar to ours. However, they assume that 
whether firms observe a signal or not is positively correlated, but the signals themselves 
are independent. This is exactly the dual of our assumption that signals are correlated but 
their arrival process is independent. As a result, in their model, it is more disclosures in 
period 1 that leads to more disclosures in period 2 (since investors believe that non-
disclosing firms have adverse information), whereas in our model, it is the nature of 
disclosure (good news or bad news) that delays or triggers disclosure by other firms. 
Hence, a key difference is that they assume the information arrival process is itself 
correlated. In contrast, in our model clustering of disclosures is due only to the strategic 
element and in particular not due to the correlated arrival of information.  Another crucial 
difference between their results and ours is that in our model, clustering is not symmetric 
in quality of news.  Specifically, when information arrival is correlated as in Dye and 
Sridhar, there is no difference in clustering of good news or bad news; in contrast, when 
information is correlated but not its arrival as in our model, there is clustering of bad 
news but not of good news.   
Dierker’s single-firm, dynamic disclosure game is different from our model in the 
managerial objective (making the market as informationally efficient as possible), the 
benefit of disclosing early (providing information to firm’s early customers), and the cost 
of disclosing early (discouraging information production by investors). Gennotte and 
Trueman also consider a single-firm model where the focus is on timing of mandated 
disclosures (for instance, should earnings be disclosed intra-day or outside of trading 
                                                 
4 Rajan (1994) examines a slightly different model in which banks coordinate on disclosure of their news. 
If state of the economy is good, then banks may hide their bank loans by extending further credit. In 
contrast, if the underlying state is bad, then banks reveal their losses. This result is generated in Rajan’s 
model through the assumptions that managers are short-termist and that in the bad state, the distribution of 
managerial types collapses to a common one.  
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hours). They examine whether multiple pieces of information reaching a firm should be 
bunched together in a disclosure or disclosed sequentially. In contrast, our focus is on 
whether information reaching a firm may be released in equilibrium in a bunched manner 
with external market information on the industry or the economy. 5  
Most of the papers discussed above, including ours, assume that managerial payoff is 
linear in market’s best expectation of manager’s type.  Aboody and Kasznik (2000) show 
empirically that disclosure decisions are also affected to an extent by option-like payoffs 
for CEOs.  Incorporating non-linear payoffs of this type should not take away much from 
the intuition of our results, but it is difficult to analytically characterize solutions in their 
presence.  Finally, we do not focus in our model on the incentives of investors to collect 
information (as in, Diamond 1985). That is, information reaching the markets in our 
model is entirely controlled by disclosure decisions of managers. 
2. Benchmark I- Strategic Disclosure without External 
News 
In this section we develop a benchmark model of strategic disclosure by a firm in the 
absence of any external news.  Our model builds on the static model of Dye (1990), in 
which investors are unsure whether the manager has learned new information.  This 
uncertainty allows managers with bad news to claim that they have no new information, 
rather than disclose it.  As a result, only firms with sufficiently good news will reveal 
their information.  We then consider a dynamic version of the model.  There we show 
that firms with bad news will delay their disclosure, and that the length of the delay is 
longer for worse news. 
                                                 
5 Teoh and Hwang (1991) consider a model wherein two types of firms (“high” and “low” types) and two 
kinds of information that firms wish to disclose (“news” which if disclosed is verifiable and “type” which is 
not verifiable). Hence, the disclosure decisions are driven by signalling considerations and have the feature 
that high types withhold good news and reveal bad news and low types do the converse. In contrast, our 
model has only type-related information, which if disclosed, is verifiable. Each piece of information in 
Teoh and Hwang is private only for a period, though their arrival is sequential, and this lends their model a 
certain dynamic aspect, even though it is quite different from ours. 
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2.1. A Model of Partial Disclosure 
Consider a single firm whose manager may learn some information relevant to the firm’s 
value.  Let the manager’s signal S be the value of the firm conditional on this new 
information.6  The manager learns this information with probability p ∈ [0,1].  Once the 
manager is informed, with probability q both the manager’s signal and the fact that the 
manager is informed are private information.  When privately informed, the manager has 
discretion regarding the release of the information:  The manager may either disclose it or 
conceal it, but if it is disclosed it is verifiable and cannot be manipulated.7  With 
probability 1− q the manager is “publicly” informed and so does not have discretion over 
the release of information and reports it immediately to the market.8    The distribution of 
the signal S is independent of whether the manager becomes informed or has discretion.   
For convenience, we assume that S is non-degenerate and continuously distributed on 
some (possibly unbounded) interval. 
The manager’s objective is to maximize the firm’s market value, which is its value 
conditional on the information available to investors.  Because the signal S is the firm’s 
expected value, if the manager discloses the signal the firm’s market value will simply be 
S.  If the manager does not disclose, the firm’s market value will be a fixed amount, v, 
based on the information contained in the fact that the manager did not disclose.  Because 
the benefit from disclosing is increasing in the manager’s signal, the equilibrium 
disclosure policy will follow a threshold rule: only firms with a signal higher than some 
threshold x∗ will disclose their information.  Naturally, the manager is willing to disclose 
S if and only if it exceeds the value the firm would have without disclosing, and so the  
manager will disclose if 
  S ≥  x∗ = v ≡ E[ S | nondisclosure ] (1) 
Consider first the case in which it is public knowledge that the manager is informed (i.e., 
p = 1 or q = 0), but investors do not know the manager’s information.  In that case the 
                                                 
6 This assumption is essentially without loss of generality and is equivalent to assuming the manager learns 
information I and the firm’s value is V, and then defining S = E[ V | I ]. 
7 This assumption of “verifiable reports” is common to the literature. See, for example, Shin (2003, 2006). 
8 This case captures situations in which either (i) the information itself is public, (ii) the fact that the 
manager has learned the information is public (in which case immediate full disclosure will occur in 
equilibrium), or (iii)  hiding the information would be too costly (perhaps due to legal concerns). 
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manager would not disclose only if S ≤ x∗, so that from (1) the equilibrium threshold 
satisfies 
  x∗ = E[ S | S ≤ x∗ ] (2)  
This equation has the unique solution that x∗ is the minimum of the support of S, and all 
information is disclosed.  This result replicates the standard “unraveling” result – noted, 
e.g., by Ross (1979), Grossman (1981), Milgrom (1981) and others – that if the market 
knows for sure that a firm holds some information then in equilibrium the firm will 
disclose its information.  
However, with p < 1, investors do not know if the manager is informed.  In that case the 
payoff in the event of non-disclosure can be calculated as  
manager is manager is privately informed without  
nondisclosure  or 
uninformed the market knowing this and *
(1 ) [ ] Pr( *) *
(1 ) Pr( *)
≤
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞ ⎛⎡ ⎤ = ⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎣ ⎦ ⎢ ⎥⎝ ⎠ ⎝⎣ ⎦
− + ≤ ⎡ ≤ ⎤⎣ ⎦= − + ≤
E S E S
S x
p E S pq S x E S S x
p pq S x
⎞⎟⎠
Hence we can write the equilibrium condition for the threshold x∗ as 
  
[ ] Pr( *) *
* ( *, )
1 Pr( *)
+ ρ ≤ ⎡ ≤ ⎤⎣ ⎦= ρ ≡ + ρ ≤S
E S S x E S S x
x h x
S x
 (3) 
where 
1
ρ ≡ −
pq
p
 is the relative likelihood that the manager is privately informed versus 
uninformed. 
Equation (3) expresses the equilibrium threshold as a fixed point of the function h.  While 
the precise solution to (3) will depend on the distribution of S, we have the following 
useful characterization, which generalizes the intuition that in the absence of disclosure, 
investors will adopt the “worst case beliefs”:9
PROPOSITION 1.  Equation (3) has a unique solution x∗ which is the equilibrium 
disclosure threshold.  This threshold is decreasing with ρ and satisfies 
                                                 
9 See appendix for all proofs not in the text. 
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  * min ( , )= ρx Sx h x  (4) 
This disclosure policy yields the lowest possible value of the firm in the event of 
non-disclosure of any policy (threshold or not).     
The proposition implies that the equilibrium is well defined and unique.  Not 
surprisingly, the amount of disclosure increases with the likelihood that the manager is 
privately informed.  Equation (4) can be interpreted as generalization of the intuition 
from the standard full-disclosure equilibrium in (2):  Investors interpret non-disclosure as 
pessimistically as possible, so that the equilibrium threshold is the one that leads to the 
lowest value for the firm in the event of non-disclosure.  Figure 1 depicts the calculation 
of the equilibrium threshold. 
Figure 1:  Calculation of Disclosure Threshold 
The left panel illustrates the disclosure threshold given the equilibrium set of non-disclosing and disclosing 
firms in the case when S is uniform on [0,1].  The right panel plots h(x∗, ρ) for ρ = 1, 10, and 100, 
confirming that the fixed point occurs at the minimum of the function h. 
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Given the equilibrium disclosure threshold x∗, we can compute the probability of 
disclosure as  
   (5) (1 Pr( *))π = − + >p q q S x
Not surprisingly, this probability increases with the probability p that the manager is 
informed.  Also, because x∗ declines with p, strategic effects imply that the rate of 
increase in π exceeds that in p. 
2.2. Dynamic Disclosure and Delay 
We now consider a dynamic version of the disclosure game in the previous section.  The 
setting is a continuous-time game for time t ∈ [0, Τ].  The probability that a manager is 
informed by time t is given by a non-decreasing function p(t).  Again we assume that 
when the manager becomes informed there is a probability q that the manager has 
discretion regarding when to disclose the signal S to the market. 
Let It be the information that is public at time t.  Then the market value of the firm on 
date t is given by vt = E[ S | It ].  We assume the manager’s payoff is increasing in the 
market value of the firm at any moment in time.  The exact form of this payoff will not 
affect the qualitative results, and so for simplicity we represent the payoff to the manager 
of firm i as 
   (6) 
0
( ) ( )
=
λ∫T t
t
t u v dt
where u is increasing and the weights λ(t) > 0 may reflect, e.g., discounting or 
fluctuations in the sensitivity of the manager’s wage to the share price.  (Again, we may 
think of the manager’s compensation as based on his perceived ability, which varies 
linearly with the firm’s market value.)   We assume the weights λ(t) are bounded above.  
What is the optimal disclosure policy for the manager in this setting?  If the firm 
discloses its signal then all information will be revealed and its market value will remain 
equal to its signal S from that point onward.  If the firm does not disclose, its market 
value will only depend on the fact that it has not yet disclosed.  Thus, the benefit from 
disclosing is increasing in the signal S, whereas the payoff from not disclosing does not 
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depend on S.   Therefore, the manager’s optimal disclosure strategy at date t can again be 
described by a threshold, which we denote by *( )x t .   
Because the likelihood the firm is informed, p(t), increases over time, the results of 
Section 2.1 suggest that if the firm does not disclose, investors will become more 
pessimistic over time regarding its information.  In that case, the market value of the firm 
will decline over time if there is no disclosure.  The manager will therefore voluntarily 
disclose if and only if the signal S exceeds the firm’s current market value absent 
disclosure.  As this condition is the same equilibrium condition as in Section 2.1, we can 
combine it with the results of PROPOSITION 1 to characterize the equilibrium disclosure 
threshold as follows: 
PROPOSITION 2.  Let  ( )( )
1 (
ρ ≡ − )
p t qt
p t
.  Then the decreasing disclosure threshold,  
  *( ) min ( , ( )) ( *( ), ( ))= ρ =x S S ρx t h x t h x t t  (7) 
is the unique equilibrium of the dynamic disclosure game. 
 
We can compute the rate of disclosure in this dynamic equilibrium by calculating the 
cumulative disclosure at each date using (5).  The next result considers the effect of 
changing the mean or variance of the firm’s signal on the equilibrium disclosure rate: 
COROLLARY A.  Suppose = a + b S with b > 0.  Then if x∗(t) is the equilibrium 
threshold for signal S, the equilibrium threshold for signal  is given by 
S
S
  *( ) *( )= +x t a b x t  (8) 
Thus, the probability of disclosure is independent of the parameters a, b. 
Proof of COROLLARY A:  The result follows immediately from the fact that 
  It can be verified that ( , ) ( ,+ ρ = + ρ SSh a bx a bh x ) *( ) *( )= +x t a b x t  is a solution to 
equation (3) with = a + b S.  \qed S
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COROLLARY A has an important, perhaps surprising, implication: the equilibrium level of 
disclosure will not depend on either the mean or the variance of the manager’s signal.  
We shall exploit this property below, when we consider the impact of outside information 
on the manager’s disclosure decision.  See Figure 2 for an illustration of the equilibrium 
when the manager’s signal is normally distributed. 
-3
-2
-1
0
1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Time
St
d.
 D
ev
. f
ro
m
 M
ea
n
x* = E[S | nondisclosure]
0%
20%
40%
60%
80%
100%
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
Time
Pr
ob
. o
f D
is
cl
os
ur
e
π(t )
Figure 2:  Dynamic Disclosure Threshold and Probability 
The left panel shows the equilibrium disclosure threshold as a function of t given p(t) = t, q = 0, and S is 
normally distributed.  The right panel shows the cumulative probability of disclosure, where it is evident 
that p(t) first-order stochastic dominates π(t). 
3. Benchmark II- External News without Preemption: 
An Irrelevance Result 
In this section we consider the impact of external news which is announced prior to the 
firm’s disclosure decision. We assume that the firm can disclose only after the external 
news is released..  We will show that under fairly general conditions, the announcement 
of prior news will have no impact on the firm’s disclosure rate.  This result will serve as a 
useful benchmark when we consider the possibility of preemptive disclosure by the firm 
in the next section. 
3.1. A Model with External News 
Consider an external news event that is informative regarding the firm’s private signal 
and market value.  This event may correspond to public news about the firm or its 
industry, or the disclosure of private information by another firm with correlated cash 
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flows.  Suppose this external news is released prior to the firm having any opportunity to 
disclose its information. 
Intuitively, a negative news announcement will cause the market value of the firm to 
decrease.  Thus, holding fixed the manager’s signal S, negative news will make it more 
likely that the manager will disclose this information.  Despite this intuition, however, we 
show in this section that if the news Y is released before the firm has the opportunity to 
reveal S, then there is no impact of the news Y on the rate of disclosure; i.e., there is no 
disclosure “clustering” after bad news in this case. 
To capture this correlation between the news and the firm’s signal, we denote the news 
announcement by the random variable Y, and suppose the firm’s signal S and the news Y 
are jointly normally distributed with a non-zero correlation.10  The news Y is announced 
at time 0, before the firm has an opportunity to disclose its information S.  How does the 
announcement of Y affect the firm’s disclosure strategy? 
In this setting, the firm’s equilibrium disclosure threshold will depend on both the 
realization of the news y and the probability that it is informed p(t), and so can be written 
as x∗(Y, t).  Because S and Y are joint normal, we can without loss of generality write  
  S = a + β Y + σ ε (9) 
where ε is a standard normal random variable and Y and ε are independent.  We assume 
(again without loss of generality) that β > 0, so that “bad news” corresponds to a low 
realization of Y.  Therefore, the announcement of the news Y will affect the mean of the 
posterior distribution of S, and also reduce its conditional variance compared to its 
unconditional variance.   
3.2. Independence of Equilibrium Disclosure Rates 
From (9) we can see that the news announcement Y changes the posterior distribution of 
the signal S according to a linear transformation of the normal distribution.  Therefore, 
we can immediately apply COROLLARY A to characterize the equilibrium: 
                                                 
10 For simplicity, we assume that firm’s signal S is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s value (and the 
manager’s payoff) given the news Y.  For a more general setting in which Y may also have an effect on the 
manager’s payoff, see Section 5.4. 
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PROPOSITION 3.  Given the news announcement Y at date 0, there exists a 
function z∗(t) such that the equilibrium disclosure threshold for the firm is given 
by11
  * ( , ) *( )= + β + σnpx Y t a Y z t  (10) 
The probability that the firm discloses by date t is independent of the news Y and 
is given by 
  [ ]( ) ( ) 1 (1 ( *( )))π = − + −t p t q q N z t  (11) 
where N is the standard normal distribution function.  This disclosure probability 
is identical to the firm’s disclosure probability if the news Y were not revealed. 
Proof of PROPOSITION 3:  Let z∗(t) be the unique solution to z∗ = hε(z∗,ρ(t)).  Because 
the conditional distribution of S can be expressed as a linear transformation of ε, (10) and 
(11) follow directly from COROLLARY A.  By the same logic, if the information Y were 
not revealed, S would have an equivalent distribution to μS + σS ε, and the probability of 
disclosure would again by given by (11).  \qed 
 
As one might expect, PROPOSITION 3 demonstrates that the firm’s disclosure threshold is 
affected by the prior news announcement.  Bad news (i.e., news such that β Y < 0) will 
lower the threshold.  Thus, for a given signal S, the firm will disclose more quickly in the 
event of bad news. 
However, while the disclosure threshold is lower given bad news, the distribution of the 
firm’s signal is also lower.  We can see by comparing (9) and (10) that these two effects 
offset each other, and in the end there is no impact on the probability of disclosure, as 
shown in (11).   
Thus we have the striking implication that, if the firm cannot preempt the external news 
announcement by disclosing its own information first, there will be no clustering effect.  
That is, the probability of disclosure by the firm will not be affected by prior news 
                                                 
11 The notation “np” stands for no-preemption, to contrast the results here with those in the next section. 
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announcements.  Intuitively, the firm will only disclose its information if it is sufficiently 
good relative to the current expectations of investors.  When there is good news, this 
news shifts upwards both the distribution of the firm’s signal and the expectations of 
investors.  These two effects offset each other, and thus there is no net increase in the 
probability of disclosure.   
Remark.  While the results in this section were derived using a normal distribution, they 
are clearly more general.  Suppose, for example, that S and Y are jointly log-normal.  
Then we can decompose S as S = a Yβ ε for some β where ε is log-normal and 
independent of Y.  The same argument again implies that the realization of Y will have no 
effect on the rate of disclosure.  Indeed, the result obtains in any setting for which the 
posterior distribution of S can be expressed as S = μ(Y) + σ(Y) ε.  
4. Preemption and Disclosure Clustering 
In this section, we change the setting of Section 3 by allowing the firm to disclose early 
and preempt the news announcement Y.  We then develop the main result of the paper:  
We show in PROPOSITION 5 below that, when preemption is possible, disclosures will be 
clustered after the announcement of bad news.  Indeed, a sufficiently negative news 
announcement can trigger an immediate disclosure of the firm’s information, and will 
accelerate the rate of disclosure if the firm delays.  
To show this result, we proceed as follows. First we extend the current model to allow for 
the possibility that the firm may receive information prior to the arrival of public news in 
Section 4.1. Section 4.2 then characterizes disclosure policies following the arrival of 
public news provided that the firm did not previously disclose its information; Section 4.3 
formalizes the disclosure decision prior to the arrival of public news, that is, under what 
conditions should the firm preempt public news with its disclosure; and, finally, Section 
4.4 derives our main result (PROPOSITION 5) on the effect of public news on disclosure 
rate. 
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4.1. A Model with Preemption 
Specifically, the model we consider is identical to the setting in Section 3 except that the 
public news announcement Y occurs at date t = 1 rather than t = 0.12  Thus, by disclosing 
its signal S in the interval t ∈ [0, 1), the firm can preempt the news announcement. 
How does the opportunity to preemptively disclose S change the equilibrium rate of 
disclosure before and after the announcement of the news Y?  For simplicity, consider the 
case in which the manager is initially informed with probability p(0) and the manager 
receives no new information between dates 0 and 1.  That is 
  p(t) = p(0) for all t ∈ [0,1] (12) 
The assumption in (12) implies that all disclosures that take place prior to date 1 will 
occur at date 0.  Intuitively, as nothing changes between date 0 and 1, a firm that would 
disclose prior to date 1 will do so immediately.  This assumption simplifies the analysis 
of the preemption stage to a single date 0 disclosure threshold, x∗(0).  We will discuss a 
setting with p(t) increasing between date 0 and 1 in Section 5.1. 
4.2. Post-News Disclosure Policies 
We begin our analysis by assuming that the manager follows an initial disclosure 
threshold x∗(0) prior to the news announcement, and solving for the equilibrium 
disclosure threshold x∗(Y, t) on date t ≥ 1 after the news announcement Y at date 1.   
Suppose that x∗(Y, t) is weakly decreasing with t (we will verify this shortly).  Then if a 
firm has not disclosed by date t, there are three possibilities: 
i) the manager was uninformed up to date t, 
ii) the manager was privately informed before date 1, and S ≤ min(x∗(0), x∗(Y, t)), 
iii) the manager was privately informed between date 1 and t, and S ≤ x∗(Y, t). 
Given these alternatives, we can compute the market value of the firm given 
nondisclosure on date t as the expected value of S conditional on Y and (i)-(iii). As in 
                                                 
12 We consider the case in which the date of the news announcement is uncertain in Section 5.2. 
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Section 2.2, the equilibrium disclosure threshold will equal this market value; the 
manager will not choose to disclose unless doing so will improve the firm’s share price 
relative to not disclosing. 
To compute the equilibrium, note that if x∗(Y, t) ≤ x∗(0), then conditions (ii) and (iii) 
above can be combined as 
ii’)  the manager was informed before date t, and S ≤ x∗(Y, t). 
Condition (ii’) is precisely the same information available in the equilibrium in the prior 
Section 3.  Therefore, the equilibrium threshold coincides with the equilibrium policy 
* ( , )npx Y t  of Section 3.1, and we have 
  *( , ) *( )= + β + σx Y t a Y z t   if  0 ( )≤Y y t  (13) 
where y0(t) is defined as the critical value such that .  Note that 
we can also interpret the condition Y ≤ y
* *
0 ( ) ( ) (0)+ β + σ ≡a y t z t x
0(t) as t ≥ t0(Y) for some t0 increasing with Y; that 
is, for any given Y, the post-news policy will eventually coincide with the no-preemption 
policy. 
Next suppose x∗(Y, t) > x∗(0), so that conditions (ii) and (iii) are stronger than (ii’).  In this 
case, the set of non-disclosing firms excludes firms that were informed before date 1 with 
signals between x∗(0) and x∗(Y, t).  Because we are excluding firms whose signal is below 
the average x∗(Y, t), this raises the average quality of the pool of non-disclosing firms 
compared to condition (ii’).  Therefore, we have shown that 
  *( , ) *( )> + β + σx Y t a Y z t   if   (14) 0 ( )>Y y t
Moreover, the above intuition suggests that the gap between x∗(Y, t) and a + βY + σz∗(t) 
increases with the gap between Y and y0(t).  The following result formalizes this intuition: 
PROPOSITION 4.  If the firm can preemptively disclose its signal S at date 0 prior 
to the news announcement Y at date 1, the equilibrium disclosure threshold at date 
t ≥ 1 is given by 
  *( , ) *( ) ( , )= + β + σ +x Y t a Y z t k Y t  (15) 
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where k(Y, t) = 0 if , and k(Y, t) > 0 and strictly increasing in Y for 
.  The threshold 
0 ( )Y y t≤
0 ( )Y y t> *( , )x Y t  strictly decreases with p(t). 
 
We illustrate the results of PROPOSITION 4 in Figure 3.  After the news Y is announced, 
the disclosure policy x∗ coincides with the no-preemption policy *npx  except when *npx  
exceeds the initial threshold x∗(0).  In that case, x∗ exceeds *npx . 
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Figure 3:  Equilibrium Post-News Disclosure Policies 
The figure shows the equilibrium post-news disclosure thresholds.  These thresholds coincide with the no-
preemption thresholds when they are below x∗(0).  When above x∗(0), they exceed the no-preemption 
thresholds by k(Y, t).  
4.3. Preemptive Disclosure 
Now that we have characterized the optimal disclosure policy for the firm once the news 
Y has been released at date 1, we consider next the equilibrium level of preemptive 
disclosure at date 0.  Let v(0) be the market value of the firm at date 0 if there is no 
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disclosure.  If the manager discloses if and only if the signal S exceeds a threshold x∗(0), 
then from the analysis in Section 2, 
  (0) ( *(0), (0))Sv h x= ρ  (16) 
In our prior analysis, we used the equilibrium condition that the manager would disclose 
if the signal S exceeded the firm’s market value.  In the case of preemptive disclosure, 
however, a real option problem emerges.  If a firm with signal S discloses at date 0, then 
the market value of the firm will equal S from that point onward.  If it does not disclose at 
date 0, there is a chance that the news Y will be sufficiently positive that its market value 
will exceed S for some time if it delays disclosure.  Disclosing at date 0 forfeits this 
option.  Thus, the firm will not disclose at date 0 unless its immediate gain from 
disclosing exceeds that value of this option. 
Formally, the immediate gain from disclosing at date 0 is u(S) − u(v(0)).  Because the 
market value of a non-disclosing firm on date t ≥ 1 is x∗(Y, t), the potential gain from not 
disclosing at date t is  (u(x∗(Y, t)) −  u(S))+.  Then, from (6), a firm with signal S prefers to 
disclose if 
  ( ) ( )1 *
0 1
( ) ( ) (0) ( ) ( , ) ( )
+∞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤λ − > λ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫t u S u v dt E t u x Y t u S dt S  (17) 
If we normalize , then the equilibrium disclosure threshold satisfies
1
0
( ) 1t dtλ =∫ 13
  ( ) ( )* 1 * *
1
(0) (0) ( ) ( , ) ( ) (0)
+∞− ⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + λ − =⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∫x u u v E t u x Y t u S dt S x  (18) 
We can use (16) and (18), together with the analysis in PROPOSITION 4 to characterize 
the equilibrium disclosure policy in this setting. 
                                                 
13 Guaranteeing the optimal strategy is indeed a threshold strategy requires showing that if (17) holds for S, 
then it holds for all S′ > S.  In the appendix we prove this for the case u(x) = x and 1
2
1 2
0σ > βρ , which puts an 
upper bound on the informativeness of the news.  This condition, however, is by no means necessary; e.g., 
in the extreme alternative case σ = 0, it is easy to see that a threshold strategy is optimal as Y is then a 
perfect signal of S and the option value of waiting disappears. As a practical matter, we can simply solve 
for x∗(0) assuming a threshold exists, and then verify that it is optimal ex post (which is the case for all 
examples we have considered). 
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4.4. Disclosure Rates and Clustering 
Now that we have characterized the equilibrium, we examine the impact of the news Y on 
equilibrium rate of disclosure.  Looking again at Figure 3, we can see the following 
intuitive implications:  First, if the public news is sufficiently poor (Y < y0(1)), then x∗(Y, 
1) < x∗(0).  Thus, if the manager is privately informed with a signal in that range, the firm 
will disclose its information immediately following the public news.   Second, if the news 
is sufficiently good (Y > y0(1)), then the optimal disclosure threshold is distorted upward 
by k(Y,1), which delays the rate of future disclosures.  We formalize both of these 
observations in the remainder of this section.   
Given news Y, the rate of pre-emptive disclosure at date 0 is given by  
  ( )*(0 | ) (0) 1 Pr (0) |⎡ ⎤π = − + ≥⎣ ⎦Y p q q S x Y  (19) 
Next, the probability of disclosure by date t ≥ 1, given the news Y, is given by  
  
( )
[ ] ( )
* *
*
( | ) (0) 1 Pr (0) ( , ) |
( ) (0) 1 Pr ( , ) |
⎡ ⎤π = − + ≥ ∧⎣ ⎦
⎡ ⎤+ − − + ≥⎣ ⎦
t Y p q q S x x Y t Y
p t p q q S x Y t Y
 (20) 
Our main interest is in the rate of disclosure in the interval between the news 
announcement at date 1 and a future date t ≥ 1, we denote by 
   (21) ( | ) ( | ) (0 | )t Y t Y YΔπ ≡ π − π
Immediate Disclosure 
Consider first , which is the probability that a firm discloses its signal 
immediately upon the announcement of the news Y.  Because p(1) = p(0), absent the 
news announcement there would be no disclosures at date 1.  Thus, if , there 
is a positive probability that the news announcement will “trigger” a disclosure. 
(1 | )YΔπ
(1| ) 0YΔπ >
We can evaluate  
   (22) * *(1| ) (0) Pr( (0) ( ,1) | )Y p q x S x Y YΔπ = ≥ ≥
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Thus, the news announcement Y can trigger a disclosure if .  From * *( ,1) (0)x Y x<
PROPOSITION 4, immediate disclosure can occur if Y < y0(1).  In that case,  
  ( ) ( )*(1| ) (0) ( (0) ) / ( )Y p q N x a Y N z t*⎡ ⎤Δπ = − −β σ −⎣ ⎦  (23) 
which strictly decreases with Y. 
Accelerated Disclosure 
Consider now the rate of disclosure in a window of time after the news announcement.  
Specifically, we look at the likelihood of a disclosure between the time of the news 
announcement and a future date t > 1 with p(t) > p(0).  In this case, additional disclosures 
will occur by firms who learn their information after the news was released.  We show 
that these disclosures create an additional dependence of the disclosure rate on the news 
Y. 
From (19)-(21), we have  
 [ ]* * *( | ) (0) Pr( (0) ( , ) | ) ( ) (0) Pr( ( , ) | )t Y p q x S x Y t Y p t p q S x Y t YΔπ = ≥ ≥ + − ≥ (24) 
Let us analyze each of the probabilities in (24) separately.  First, from the results of 
PROPOSITION 4, 
  ( ) ( )* * * *Pr( (0) ( , ) | ) ( (0) ) / ( )x S x Y t Y N x a Y N z t +⎡ ⎤≥ ≥ = − − β σ −⎣ ⎦  (25) 
This expression is strictly decreasing in Y for Y < y0(t).   
The second probability in (24) reflects disclosures by firms newly informed during the 
period between date 1 and date t.  Again using the results of PROPOSITION 4, 
  ( )* *Pr( ( , ) | ) 1 ( ) ( , ) /S x Y t Y N z t k Y t⎡ ⎤≥ = − + σ⎣ ⎦  (26) 
Recall that k(Y, t) is increasing in Y, and therefore this probability is decreasing, in Y for Y 
> y0(t). 
Combining these results leads to our main result of the paper, relating the rate of 
disclosure with the quality of the public news announcement: 
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PROPOSITION 5.  For any date t > 1 after the public news announcement, the 
probability of disclosure ( | )t YΔπ  during after the period [1, t] is strictly 
decreasing in Y throughout the support of Y.  If Y < y0(1), there is a positive 
probability, which is higher if Y is lower, of an immediate discretionary disclosure 
at date 1, followed by a disclosure rate that does not depend on Y.  If Y > y0(1), 
there is no immediate discretionary disclosure at date 1, and the rate of subsequent 
disclosures decreases with Y.   
5. Extensions of the Model 
5.1. Continuous Preemption and Information Blackouts 
In the basic model in Section 4, the firm either learns its signal at date 0 or after the news 
announcement on date 1.  Here we consider what happens if the firm’s signal has a 
positive arrival rate between dates 0 and 1, so that p(t) is increasing on this interval. 
With p(t) increasing on [0,1], the firm may learn and potentially disclose its information 
at any time during this interval.  Given the firm’s equilibrium disclosure strategy, absent 
disclosure the firm’s market value will be its expected value given that it has not yet 
disclosed, which we denote by v(t).  Then a firm with signal S will benefit from 
disclosing at date τ rather than wait until after the news announcement only if  
  ( ) ( )1 *
1
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( )
+∞
τ
⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤λ − > λ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦∫ ∫t u S u v t dt E t u x Y t u S dt S  (27) 
Now, while the right-hand side of (27) is strictly positive and independent of τ, the left-
hand side of (27) tends to 0 as τ approaches 1.  Therefore, for any signal, there is a point 
in time such that the firm would rather wait for the release of the public news before 
deciding whether to disclose its information.  Intuitively, the option value of waiting 
exceeds the benefit of increasing its stock price for a very short interval of time.   
This observation implies that the equilibrium threshold strategy, x∗(t),  prior to the release 
of public news satisfies x∗(t) → ∞ as t → 1.  We refer to this as an information blackout, 
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as it states that voluntary disclosures should be very rare just prior to public news 
announcements whose timing is known.14   
A second key implication is that in this setting, because x∗(Y,1) is finite, there will be a 
positive probability of an immediate disclosure after the public news is released, and the 
probability of an immediate disclosure is higher for lower realizations of Y.   This 
strengthens the result in Section 4, where an immediate disclosure only occurs for Y 
sufficiently low. 
5.2. Stochastic News Arrival 
Until now we assumed the arrival date of the public news is common knowledge.  This is 
often the case, for example, for government news releases and other forms of aggregate 
data.  A natural question is how our results would change if the timing of the public news 
is random.   
Suppose, for example, the arrival date of the public news has an exponential distribution 
with arrival rate γ, so that the probability that the news will arrive in the interval between 
t and t + dt, given that it has not yet arrived, is γ dt. 
Consider a firm’s decision whether to preempt the external information and release its 
information at time t as compared to the alternative of waiting until t + dt.  The gain from 
preempting at time t is given by  
 ( )( ) ( ) ( )λ −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦t u S u v t dt  
The potential loss is that the public news is released between t and t + dt and is 
sufficiently positive that the firm regrets having disclosed its signal.  The expected loss is 
given by: 
  ( )*( ) ( , ) ( ) +∞+⎡ ⎡ ⎤γ λ −⎣ ⎦⎢⎣ ⎦∫t dtdt E t u x Y t u S dt S ⎤⎥
                                                
  
The equilibrium disclosure threshold should therefore satisfy 
 
14 We note that in this case the equilibrium disclosure threshold is likely to be non-monotonic on [0,1].  For 
t near 0, the disclosure threshold may fall as p(t) increases, and then rise as t approaches 1 and the option 
value of delaying dominates.   
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 ( ) ( )* 1 1 * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )+∞− −⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + γ λ λ τ − τ =⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∫tx t u u v t t E u x Y t u S d S x t  
This equation is nearly identical to the equation we obtained in (18). Hence, the 
equilibrium behavior is essentially the same as in the case we examined.  If, for example, 
the weights λ correspond to standard exponential discounting, then the only change over 
time comes from the increase in p(t).  In that case, the disclosure threshold x∗(t) would 
gradually decline as p(t) increased prior to the public news release. 
5.3. Multiple firms 
A natural extension is a model with no external signal but with multiple firms. For 
simplicity suppose there are two symmetric firms: A and B whose signals are given by 
AS  and .  As we shall see the equilibrium is similar to the equilibrium of stochastic 
news arrival that we have just examined. However, the construction of the equilibrium 
presents a significant computational challenge.  
BS
The key observation is the fact that from firms A’s perspective, B’s signal is an external 
signal. Let γΒ(t | SB) denote the equilibrium arrival density of B’s disclosure conditional 
on B’s signal, so that the probability that B will disclose in the interval between t and t + 
dt, given that it has not yet disclosed, is γΒ(t | SB)dt. 
Consider firm A’s decision whether to preempt and release its information at time t as 
compared to the alternative of waiting until t + dt. A’s decision to disclose is similar the 
case of stochastic arrival of an external signal: 
( ) ( )* 1 1 * *( ) ( ) ( ) ( | ) ( ) ( , ) ( ) ( )+∞− −⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤= + λ γ λ τ − τ =⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∫B B B Atx t u u v t t E t S u x S t u S d S x t  
Once the threshold x∗(t) is determined, it will then determine the arrival density of A’s 
announcement, γΑ(t | SA).  A symmetric equilibrium then requires the solution of the 
additional fixed point problem (γA = γB), which is computationally quite challenging.    In 
such a setting, our qualitative results regarding immediate disclosure would continue to 
apply and would lead to the clustering of news announcements by firms, with clustering 
more likely the more negative the news. 
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5.4. Alternative Payoffs and Relative Performance 
We have assumed so far that the manager’s payoff depends only upon the expected value 
of the firm conditional on the manager’s information.  To see why this might be the case, 
suppose the manager is compensated based on some increasing function of his perceived 
ability α, and let S = α + η, where α and η are joint normal.  Suppose also that Y = S + θ, 
where the noise θ is independent of (α, η).  Then the signal S is a sufficient statistic for 
the manager’s ability, and E[α | S,Y], is a linear function of S.  Thus, the manager’s 
objective of maximizing utility over his expected compensation is equivalent to 
maximizing an increasing function of the market value of the firm.   
In the previous example the manager’s ability affects the firm’s absolute performance.  A 
natural alternative to consider is one in which the manager’s ability determines the firm’s 
relative performance.  We argue that the qualitative conclusions of our model will 
continue to apply.  To see why, consider for example the extreme case in which S = Y + 
α, where Y and α are independent and joint normal.    
Suppose first that Y is revealed at t = 0 and there is no possibility of preemption. Because  
α = S − Y, we can reinterpret the manager’s signal as α and it is immediate that the 
disclosure threshold α∗(t) and therefore the disclosure rate will not depend on Y.  Thus, 
our results in Section 3 carry through as before.  
Now suppose that Y is realized at t = 1 so that S can be disclosed before Y is revealed.  
Then the equilibrium will be similar to our analysis in Section 4.  The disclosure 
threshold x∗(0) at date 0 will reflect a real option premium (i.e., x∗(0) > v(0)), as the agent 
with type S = v(0) would regret disclosing if Y is sufficiently high (specifically, if S − Y < 
α∗(1)).   As in our current model, at date t = 1 there will be a positive probability of 
immediate disclosure if the market news Y is sufficiently low (so that Y + α∗(1) < x∗(0)).  
On the other hand, if Y is high, disclosure will be delayed.  Thus, all of the qualitative 
conclusions of our model continue to hold if the agent is compensated based on relative 
rather than absolute performance.   
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6. Implications for Asset Pricing  
An important implication of our results is that with strategic timing of disclosures by 
managers, the process of information arrival to markets is different from the process of 
information arrival to firms and managers.  For instance, the underlying information 
process may have constant variability over time and no skewness, but this need not be 
true of the process describing disclosed information.  Below, we discuss the specific 
implications of our dynamic disclosure model for the skewness and volatility of observed 
stock returns.   
Return Skewness.  The basic model of strategic delay developed in Section 2 of the paper 
implies that individual stock returns will tend to exhibit positive skewness, as firms 
release good news but delay the disclosure of bad news.  The average positive skewness 
in individual stock returns was documented early by Beedles (1979) and is reproduced 
for more recent data in Figure 4.  Such positive skewness should disappear in our model 
at the point that p(t) = 1, and full disclosure occurs.  This pattern is consistent with 
McNichols (1988), who finds less positive skewness in earnings announcement periods 
(when disclosures are likely to be involuntary) compared to non-announcement periods 
(when disclosures are more likely to be strategic).   
While this effect of disclosure timing on average positive skewness of individual stock 
returns has been suggested elsewhere (for example, in Damodaran, 1985), our model with 
public news in Section 4 implies an important, additional conditional pattern.  In periods 
without public news, stock returns will be positively skewed as the firm voluntarily 
releases good news.  When public news is announced, however, returns will be 
negatively skewed.  The reason is that when the public news is good, it is more likely that 
the firm would have preemptively released good news, mitigating the effect of the news 
on the stock price.  When the public news is bad, however, the firm is less likely to have 
previously disclosed its information, in which case the stock’s return will respond to the 
public news fully.   
Conditional Correlation (Beta).  This asymmetry in the response of disclosures to the 
nature of public news implies that individual stock returns will be more sensitive to 
aggregate market news when the market news is negative.  This implication also finds 
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empirical support.  Ang and Chen (2002)  document that correlations between U.S. stocks 
and the aggregate U.S. market are much greater for downside moves, especially for 
extreme downside moves, than for upside moves, and that these correlations differ from 
the conditional correlations implied by a normal distribution.  Interestingly, they find that 
the downside correlation is stronger for small stocks, where managerial ability to 
strategically time disclosures may be greater due to investor inattention, and for past loser 
stocks, where there may be greater adverse information that is being delayed for release 
until market news arrives. 
Further, the asymmetry in response to public news and the resulting downside correlation 
of firm returns helps explain the empirical result that while individual stock returns tend 
to be positively skewed on average, stock market indices tend to have negatively skewed 
returns (Alles and Kling, 1994, and also see Figure 4 for recent evidence regarding index 
returns).  The existing literature has found it hard to reconcile the differential nature of 
skewness in firm-level and market-level stock returns, and in fact, often interpreted the 
difference as lack of consensus on evidence of skewness.  In contrast, this differential 
pattern of skewness in returns arises naturally in our model. 
Volatility and the Leverage Effect.  Finally, our result regarding the acceleration of 
disclosure after bad market news implies that return volatility will increase after negative 
shocks.  This is consistent with the so-called “leverage effect” (Black, 1976) that 
conditional on negative returns, return volatility tends to increase.  In most striking 
evidence of this effect, Officer (1973) and Schwert (1989, 1990) document that stock 
market’s return variability has been unusually high during downturns such as the 1929-33 
Great Depression and the stock market crash of 1987.  They contend that the amplitude of 
the fluctuations in aggregate stock volatility is difficult to explain using simple models of 
stock valuation, especially during downturns.  Our model provides a potential 
explanation for these findings since the arrival of adverse public news during market 
downturns should accelerate the disclosure of information by firms and result in greater 
volatility.  Finally, the feature that stock return volatility is stochastic and negatively 
correlated with the level of returns, is now considered essential in explaining observed 
option prices.  For example, Heston (1993)  
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Figure 4:  Positive skewness of individual stock returns and negative skewness of index returns 
The figure shows the fraction of up (positive stock return) days as a function of absolute stock return 
divided by the trailing volatility of stock returns (computed as the standard deviation of returns over the 
prior 100 days).  The dotted line shows the fraction of up days for each stock on the New York Stock 
Exchange over the period 1998-2007 and averaged across all stocks.  The solid line plots the fraction 
calculated for a value-weighted index of stock returns over the same period.  Note that the majority of large 
moves for individual stocks tend to be positive, whereas large moves in the index tend to be negative. 
 
shows that a stochastic volatility model where shocks to volatility are negatively 
correlated to shocks to returns can fit index option prices well in that it can explain the 
(Black-Scholes model-based) implied volatility “skew” in index option prices.15  Our 
model’s implications thus carry over to options markets as well. 
To summarize, skewness and volatility related patterns observed in stock returns are 
consistent with the dynamics of disclosures by firms and the incentives of managers who 
have discretion over disclosure timing.  In contrast to the existing literature which has 
                                                 
15 Implied volatility “skew” in index option prices is used to describe the pattern that volatility numbers to 
be put into the Black-Scholes model to fit observed index option prices exhibit a declining relationship with 
the option strike price.  This is now universally considered to be a violation of the Black-Scholes 
assumption that stock return volatility is constant over time or is deterministic. 
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often treated such patterns as a statistical artifact of data, our model provides a common 
information-theoretic foundation for their existence.16 Further work is warranted in order 
to separate this mechanism for volatility and skewness related stock-return patterns from 
the ones related to trading frictions suggested elsewhere in the literature. 
7. Conclusion 
In this paper, we provided a dynamic disclosure model in which the announcement of bad 
news hastens the disclosure of information by firms, resulting in bunching of disclosures. 
Since positive correlation of public news and firms’ private information is a critical factor 
driving this result, our model implies that disclosures should be more clustered within 
industries and geographies, as empirically found by Tse and Tucker (2007) and Kedia 
and Rajgopal (2007), respectively. 
We assumed throughout our analysis that delaying disclosure is costless for firms. In 
practice, non-disclosure might entail real costs since the firm would have to bypass 
observable activities warranted by this information, for example, continue to make 
investment even in response to adverse information about its prospects.17  Another 
possibility is that there may be litigation risk associated with delay in releasing 
information.  Some researchers (Skinner, 1994, Trueman, 1997) have argued that 
litigation risk can explain why firms voluntarily disclose bad news.18  Conversely, there 
might also be strategic benefits to a firm from not disclosing information when such 
information has not yet reached its competitors or the market as a whole.  Dierker (2002) 
analyzes a dynamic disclosure model with such considerations.  Modeling more explicitly 
                                                 
16 Shin (2003, 2006), discussed in the related literature section, represent contributions that share this 
theme. Both papers consider single-firm (one-time) disclosure models with verifiable reports where a 
manager attempts to maximize the current share price and the markets rationally anticipate manager’s 
disclosure policy. The models generate implications such as the appearance of short-run momentum and 
long-run reversal in returns and the higher return variance following a poor disclosed outcome.  Rogers, 
Schrand and Verrecchia (2007), cited above, find evidence for some of the implications of Shin’s models 
for firm-level and market-level return and return volatility. 
17 Rajan (1994) examines coordination and strategic delay in the recognition of bad loans by banks. He 
assumes that in order to hide bad loans, banks must continue lending or make new loans to the defaulted 
borrowers, which is costly in real terms. He shows that when bank loan portfolios are correlated, strategic 
delay in recognition of bad loans can induce a low-frequency cycle in the real sector, characterized by 
excessive extension of credit in good times. 
18 Such effects are captured to some extent in a reduced-form fashion in our model by the parameter q, 
which represents the likelihood with which the firm has no discretion over the release of its information. 
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the cost or benefits of non-disclosure within our framework could potentially lead to 
further empirical predictions.  We leave such an extension for future work. 
An alternative motive for delayed disclosure that has been proposed is managerial short-
termism.  While our model of the manager’s objective is general enough to include such 
features, it is interesting to note that in our setting the impact of short-termism is 
ambiguous.  For example, decreasing the weight λ(t) that the manager puts on the stock 
price after the public announcement (t > 1) will reduce the real option effect of delay and 
lead to greater disclosure in period 0. 
Finally, we believe our dynamic disclosure game has interesting asset-pricing 
implications for skewness and volatility of firm-level and market-wide stock returns.  
Fully establishing the empirical link between strategic timing of disclosures and these 
features of stock returns appears to be a promising line of enquiry for further work.   
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Appendix 
Proof of PROPOSITION 1:  First note that hS(x, ρ) < E[S] for x in the interior of the support 
of S, and that hS(x, ρ) → E[S] as x → ± ∞.  Therefore hS has a minimum in the interior of 
the support of S.  Suppose that x∗ satisfies ( *, ) *Sh x xρ = ; then x∗ represents the average 
type in a pool of types who were either uninformed, or privately informed with a signal 
lower than x∗. 
Now consider hS(x,ρ), with x > x∗.  In this case, relative to the pool of types 
corresponding to hS(x*,ρ), we have to include new types in the pool that are informed and 
exceed x∗.   This must raise the quality of average type above x*.  Thus, hS(x,ρ) > 
hS(x∗,ρ).  Next consider hS(x,ρ), with x < x∗.  In this case, relative to the pool of types 
corresponding to hS(x*,ρ),  we have to exclude types from the pool that are informed but 
below x∗.  Since we are eliminating some types that are lower than the average quality of 
pool, this must also raise the quality of average type above x*.  Thus again, hS(x,ρ) > 
hS(x∗,ρ).  Therefore, the equilibrium threshold x∗ = hS(x∗,ρ) occurs at the unique minimum 
of the function hS.   
To see that threshold strategies lead to the worst possible beliefs, consider any disclosure 
strategy Γ (threshold or not) and let v = E[ S | nondisclosure given Γ ].  Then given these 
beliefs, the optimal policy Γ′ for the manager is to disclose if S > v and not disclose if S ≤ 
v.   Unless the two policies coincide almost surely, then under Γ′ some above average 
types are removed from the pool of non-disclosers, and some below average types are 
added, so that E[ S | nondisclosure given Γ′ ] < v.    
Finally, because hS decreases with ρ, so does the threshold.  \qed   
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 2:  Because the payoff from non-disclosure does not depend on 
the firm’s true type, it is immediate that the optimal strategy can be expressed as a 
threshold.  Because p(t) is increasing, the optimal threshold in (7) is decreasing with t.  
As a result, only the current threshold is relevant in determining the firm’s market value 
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absent disclosure, which is given by ( *( ), ( ))= ρt Sv h x t t .  Finally, because v(t) also 
declines with t, it is optimal for the firm to disclose if and only if S exceeds v(t), and so 
*( )x t  is indeed an equilibrium threshold.   
To see that the equilibrium is unique, note that by the same reasoning as in the static case, 
any equilibrium must involve a threshold strategy (the gain from disclosure is increasing 
in type).  Let x(t) be some other disclosure policy, and let v(t) be the market value of the 
firm in the event of non-disclosure under this policy.  Note first that if x(t) is an 
equilibrium, and if t′ > t, then 
 x(t) ≥ v(t) ≥ x∗(t) ≥ x∗(t′). (28) 
The first inequality follows because the manager would not disclose if it would lower the 
current share price.  The second follows because, from PROPOSITION 1, the share price 
x∗(t) is the lowest possible share price under any beliefs regarding the manager’s 
disclosure policy.  Finally, the last follows because x∗(t) is weakly decreasing. 
Next we claim that  
 x(t) = v(t) if and only if x(t) = x∗(t). (29) 
To see why, note with this disclosure threshold at date t, because x(t) = x∗(t) < x(s) for all 
s < t from (28), the set of non-disclosing firms is precisely the same as the set that is 
privately informed with S < x∗(t), and thus x∗(t) = h(x∗(t), ρ(t)) = v(t).  The “only if” 
follows because, as in the static case, this fixed point is unique (lowering the threshold 
from any fixed point must raise the share price). 
Finally, note that if x(t) > v(t), it must be that v(t∗) = sup{ v(t′) : t′ > t } > x(t) (it pays to 
delay disclosure only if a higher price can be obtained in the future from not disclosing).  
But then because x(t∗) = v(t∗) (there is no reason to delay at t∗), we have from (28) and 
(29) that v(t∗) = x∗(t∗) ≤ x(t), a contradiction.   
\qed 
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Proof of PROPOSITION 4:  For a fixed t ≥ 1, let ρ0 = p(0)q/(1−p(t)), ρt = 
(p(t)−p(0))q/(1−p(t)), and with some abuse of notation we define   
0 0 0
0
0 0
[ | ] Pr( | ) , Pr( | ) ,
( , , )
1 Pr( | ) Pr( | )
t
t
E S Y S x Y E S S x Y S x Y E S S x Y
h x x Y
S x Y S x Y
+ ρ ≤ ⎡ ≤ ⎤ + ρ ≤ ⎡ ≤ ⎤⎣ ⎦ ⎣≡ + ρ ≤ + ρ ≤
⎦  
Then  is the expected value of a firm given news Y, if it learned its signal was 
below x
0( , , )h x x Y
0 at date 0, or it learned its signal was below x after date 0 but by date t.  Because 
a firm will disclose if its signal is above the lowest threshold that occurs after it learns its 
information, firms that learn their information at date 0 will disclose if S > min(x∗(0), 
x∗(Y, t)), and those that learn their information later will disclose if S > x∗(Y, t).  So, 
letting  to shorten notation, we have* *0 (0)=x x 19
  * * *0( ( , ), ( , ) , ) ,  nondisclosure by date h x Y t x Y t x Y E S Y t∧ = ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (30)  
Using the intuition from PROPOSITION 1, define the function h∗ to be the most 
pessimistic assessment of the disclosure threshold 
   (31) * * *0( , ) min ( , , )xh x y h x x x y≡ ∧   0
0
Then, by an identical argument to PROPOSITION 1, the equilibrium post-news disclosure 
threshold satisfies 
  * * * * * *0( , ) ( , ) ( ( , ), ( , ) , )x y t h x y h x Y t x Y t x Y= = ∧  (32) 
Now, using PROPOSITION 3, 
   (33) * * *0( , ) min ( , , ) ( )xh x y h x x y a y z t≥ = + β +   σ
*and the inequality is strict if and only if *0 ( )x a y z t< + β + σ , or equivalently y > y0(t).  
Therefore, 
  * * *0( , ) ( , ) ( )= = + β + σ *x y t h x y a y z t  for all y ≤ y0(t). (34) 
For y > y0(t), note that we can write 
                                                 
19 We use the notation x∧y = min(x, y). 
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0
* * * * * *
0 0 0 0( , ) ( , ) ( , )
y
y y
h x y h x y h x y dy∂∂
⎛= + ⎜⎝ ⎠∫  
⎞⎟   (35) 
Now, (9) implies that .  Therefore, * *0 0( , ) ( , )h x y h x y+ βδ + δ = + βδ
  * *0 0
0
( , ) ( , )
x y
h x y h x y∂ ∂∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞ ⎛β +⎜ ⎟ ⎜⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎞ = β⎟  (36) 
Combining (34)-(36) we have 
  
0
0
* * * * * *
0 0 0 0
0
* * *
0
0
( , ) ( , ) ( , )
( ) ( , )
y
y
y
y
x
x
h x y h x y h x y dy
a y z t h x y dy
∂
∂
∂
∂
⎡ ⎤⎛ ⎞= + β −β⎢ ⎥⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎣ ⎦
⎛ ⎞= + β + σ −β ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
∫
∫


 (37) 
Therefore, we have 
  
0
* *
0
0
( , ) ( , )
y
y x
k y t h x y dy∂∂
⎛ ⎞≡ −β ⎜⎝ ⎠∫ ⎟
*
 (38) 
Note further that for y > y0(t), because  
  * * *0 0( ) min ( , , ) ( , )xx a y z t h x x y h x y< + β + σ = <   ,  (39) 
increasing *0x  lowers the average quality of the non-disclosing firms and hence 
*
0
0
( , ) 0
x
h x y∂∂ < .  Thus, k is strictly increasing in y, as claimed.  Finally, we verify that 
the threshold is decreasing in p(t) by noting that  declines with p(t).  \qed *0( , , )h x x x y∧ 
 
Proof that a threshold strategy is optimal prior to news announcement (Section 4.3): 
Here we provide a justification for a threshold strategy prior to the public news 
announcement.  To simplify the analysis, here we assume that the manager’s payoff 
function u is linear.  Given this assumption, it is sufficient to analyze the case u(v) = v. 
Consider the condition (17).  We need to show that if this condition holds for some type 
S, it holds for all higher types.  Now, the left hand side of (17) clearly increases with S.  
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Thus, it is enough to show that the right hand side of (17) weakly decreases with S.  
Without loss of generality normalize S so that a = 0 and note that we can write 
2 2Y S
β= β + σ + η   where S and 
2
2 2~ 0,N
⎛ ση ⎜ ⎞⎟β + σ⎝ ⎠
 are independent.  Therefore, 
  
* *
2
*
2 2 2 2
( , ) ( ) ( , )
( ) ,
x Y t S Y z t k Y t S
z t k S t S
− = β + σ + −
⎛ ⎞β σ= η+ σ + + η −⎜ ⎟β + σ β + σ⎝ ⎠
 
and so the result follows if 
  ( ) 22 2 2 2 0' ,k Y t ≤β σ−β + σ β + σ   or equivalently  ( )
2
' ,k Y t ≤ σβ  (40) 
This condition obviously holds if Y ≤ y0(t), since then k′ = 0.  Consider the case Y = y > 
y0(t) and therefore * 0( , ) *x y t x> .  Using the expression for k in (38), we can write (40) as 
  
2
* *
0 2
0
( , )
x
h x y∂∂
σ≥ − β  (41) 
Now, from (31), 
 
* * * *
0 0 0
0
* * * *
0 0 * *
0 0 0
0
( ( , ), , )
( , ) ( ( , ), , )
( , )1 t
x x
x y x h x y t x yn
h x y h x y t x y
x y x y t yN N
∂ ∂
∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞⎛−β −ρ ⎜ ⎟⎜σ σ⎝ ⎠⎝= = ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−β −β+ ρ + ρ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟σ σ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
⎞⎟⎠  (42) 
Because * * * *0 0( ( , ), , ) ( , )x h x y t x y x y t< = , and because h decreases with ρt, the magnitude 
of (42) decreases with ρt.  Thus, it is sufficient to establish (41) for the case ρt = 0.  Also, 
because with ρt = 0, 
*
* * 0
0( ( , ), , ) ,
x yh x y t x y y hε
⎛ ⎞−β
0= β + σ ρ⎜ σ⎝ ⎠⎟
, we can substitute 
*
0x yz −β= σ  in (42) and so a sufficient condition for (42) is 
   
( ) ( )( )
( )
2
0 0
0 2
0
,
( , )
1 z
n z z h z
h z
N z
ε
ε
∂
∂
ρ − ρ σ= ρ ≥ −+ ρ β   for all z. (43) 
38 
Because hε < 0, 
  
( ) ( )( )
( )
0 0 0
0 0
0
,
( ) (1)
1 4
n z z h z
n z z n
N z
ερ − ρ ρ> −ρ ≥ −ρ > −+ ρ  (44) 
a very weak sufficient condition for a threshold strategy to be optimal is that 1 02σ > β ρ .  
This condition is extremely weak, in part because we have required monotonicity of the 
right hand side of (17) state-by-state, rather than in expectation.  Indeed, in the extreme 
alternative case σ = 0, it is easy to see that a threshold strategy is optimal:  Y is then a 
perfect signal of S, and the option value of waiting disappears.  \qed 
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